The about page has, since launch, cited the Bank of England and Gallagher Re as evidence that this index measures a real, already-recognized risk rather than a hypothetical one. Worth going deeper on what those two sources actually say — because they arrived at the same conclusion from very different vantage points, months apart, without citing each other.
A central bank's view: concentration as a systemic-risk channel
The Bank of England's Prudential Regulation Authority published a discussion paper, "Algorithmic Systemic Risk in Financial Services: A Framework for Assessment," identifying concentration in third-party model and infrastructure provision as a distinct channel through which AI adoption could threaten financial stability. Its own framing: if a widely used model exhibits a correlated failure, a systematic bias, an availability incident, or an exploited vulnerability, the effect is felt simultaneously across every firm that relies on it — "in a way that resembles a monoculture more than a diversified market." The Bank's Financial Policy Committee reached the same conclusion in its own Financial Stability Report: rapid AI adoption is increasing financial-stability risk specifically because of how few underlying providers sit behind it.
That's a regulator describing exactly the mechanism this index tracks — and, by its own account, lacking the tooling to monitor it in real time across the sector.
A reinsurer's view: you can't price what you can't evaluate
Gallagher Re's Ed Pocock, Global Head of Cyber Security, reached a parallel conclusion from the pricing side in a June 2026 report. On model homogeneity: it "risks erasing useful differentiation between systems and increasing concentration risk." On the practical consequence for underwriting: "if a model cannot be independently evaluated, it cannot be meaningfully priced" — and without that independent evaluation, insurers "risk defaulting to scale and brand as proxies for safety, which could amplify the concentration risks we'll need to manage."
Read those two sentences next to the Bank of England's monoculture framing and the shape of the problem is identical: nobody publishing on this topic currently has a running, sourced count of which institutions actually depend on which model family, sector-wide.
Where this index sits
We're not a regulator and we're not an underwriter — we're the measurement layer neither of those write about themselves. 69 institutions, 92 documented vendor relationships, 10 countries, every row traced to a primary source: an official case study, a press release, an executive on the record. Not a survey, not a model, not an estimate — a running count of what's actually been disclosed.
If you sit on either side of this — a regulator's systemic-risk desk or an underwriting team pricing correlated failure — the data table and methodology are both fully public. We're also in beta on a dashboard for teams that want this tracked continuously rather than checked page by page; see the product page if that's useful.